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Appendix D:  
Comments by Ann Cudd1  
 
In this paper, Thomas Pogge aims to extend his argument for the claim 
that we (relatively affluent persons) have a negative duty to do our part to 
end global poverty, in order to show that by not discharging this negative 
duty we are violating the human rights of the poor. Many, including Pogge, 
have argued for a duty to the poor. His distinctive contribution to the litera-
ture is to argue that there is not only an open-ended positive duty to im-
prove the global institutional order, nor that there is simply a collective du-
ty for some collective bodies to improve the global institutional order. As 
contrasted with Peter Singer’s argument for a positive duty to aid the poor,
2
 
Pogge emphasizes the negative duty aspect of his argument using the ac-
tive language of violating the human rights of the poor. Like Singer, Pogge 
attempts to make the argument that each individual has a negative duty by 
emphasizing that this negative duty violation is something we do as indi-
vidual actors. His strong claim is that “human rights violations are crimes 
actively committed by particular human agents,” and that we are commit-




Pogge distinguishes between two kinds of human rights violations: in-
teractional, where agents do things that avoidably deprive human beings of 
secure access to their rights, and institutional, where agents design and im-
pose institutional arrangements that deprive them of that access. It is not 
news that there are individuals who violate the human rights of the poor in 
an interactional sense; there are numerous dictators who have done this by 
deploying their armies to block foreign aid from reaching the poor, for ex-
ample. Pogge focuses, in this paper, on institutional violations, since that 
implicates all of “us” – average citizens of relatively stable, wealthy coun-
tries. And yet he argues that we each are implicated as individuals in institu-
tional violations of human rights. This is a bold, challenging claim; more 
personally challenging than either Singer’s arguments for positive duties 
that individuals have to the poor or Pogge’s institutional-based arguments 
for our collective duties to the poor. 
 Pogge cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence 
that there is wide acceptance of human rights including the right to secure 
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access to the means of basic subsistence, and he cites World Bank statistics 
to show that this right is not fulfilled for over a billion human beings. Alt-
hough there are interactional causes for some severe poverty, Pogge argues 
that it is primarily caused by the institutional background of the global 
economic system. He acknowledges the gap between a right being unful-
filled and there being a responsibility to fulfill that right on the part of 
someone, and sets out to bridge that gap. Institutional human rights viola-
tions involve non-fulfillment of human rights combined with a certain 
causal responsibility for this non-fulfillment. Pogge aims to show that we – 
each of us – are causally responsible for this non-fulfillment, and hence are 
actively committing this crime against humanity.  
Our causal responsibility stems from the fact that we are complicit in 
the global institutional order that creates severe poverty or allows it to con-
tinue by creating obstacles to the economic development of the poor. Pogge 
claims that we are complicit because we authorize the global order through 
our citizenship in countries that could change the order in a way that 
would dismantle these obstacles and end global poverty. Such obstacles are 
unjust. Not only do we have a duty to construct just institutions, we also 
have a negative duty not to collaborate in the imposition of unjust institu-
tions. We violate the human rights of the poor when we impose unjust in-
stitutions on them. In this way we are not just uninvolved bystanders who 
could rescue the poor, but we are complicit in the construction and mainte-
nance of the very conditions that create poverty.  We must therefore desist. 
Furthermore, because each of us (the relatively affluent in relatively afflu-
ent countries) is complicit in the construction and maintenance of these 
conditions, we each have a duty to repair if we cannot individually disman-
tle the poverty creating conditions. 
Pogge identifies six specific ways in which the global order is harmful 
or unfair to the poor: (1) It permits unjust rulers to sell the natural resources 
of their countries; (2) It permits banks in affluent countries to lend money to 
such rulers and then compels people to repay even after the ruler is gone; 
(3) Affluent countries facilitate embezzlement of funds by public officials in 
less developed countries by allowing their banks to accept these funds; (4) 
Affluent countries facilitate tax evasion in less developed countries through 
lax accounting standards for multinational corporations; (5) Affluent coun-
tries account for disproportionate share of global pollution; (6) Affluent 
countries erect trade barriers which poor countries cannot match, and de-
stroy more jobs in less developed countries. These are specific ways that we 
cause harm and violate the human rights of the poor. Thus, we must desist 
from causing harm in these ways. 
In my comments I will briefly discuss some of these ways in which 
Pogge claims we collectively violate the human rights of the poor and then 
ask whether he succeeds in showing that we each have a negative duty as 
an individual in these respects. Then I will discuss the particular ways 
Pogge thinks we can discharge our individual duties with regard to our vi-
olations of the human rights of the poor. I raise three kinds of problems for 
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Pogge’s argument: epistemic problems, a feasibility problem, and collectivi-
ty problems. 
The first three ways the global order harms the poor involve our recog-
nition of ruling elites of poor countries as the legitimate rulers, which al-
lows them to sell natural resources or take loans on behalf of the country. 
Pogge argues that purchasing natural resources from illegitimate rulers, or 
giving loans to such rulers, and allowing them to deposit funds from these 
activities into secure bank accounts are ways in which we are complicit 
with the human rights violations attendant on severe poverty. Therefore, 
we should prohibit such activities by private businesses or banks and pro-
hibit international institutions from providing them with loans.  
Although it is clear in the case of some horrendous dictators that no 
business should be done with them, there are line-drawing problems with 
the general proscription not to trade with dictators or allow them access to 
international banking. Is the criterion for such shunning set by the specific 
project (in the case of loans) or by the general behavior of the ruler? If the 
latter, then how bad does the dictator need to be?  Where do we draw the 
line between say governments that come into power through thoroughly 
unfair elections and those that do so through one-party rule?  Furthermore, 
we might end up disallowing projects that are actually helpful to the popu-
lation, since even dictators sometimes do some good for their people. If we 
choose the former, how bad does the project have to be? How do we draw a 
line between projects that are motivated by greed or vanity and those that 
are simply unwise? Making these judgments would seriously encroach on 
the ability of a people to collectively self-govern, and would open us to 
charges of elitism or worse. Because the answers to these questions are not 
clear, there is an epistemic problem with knowing precisely what we 
should do. 
Regarding the fifth point, pollution by affluent countries affects the 
global poor insofar as it creates global climate changes that result in disas-
trous weather events and rising sea levels. But much pollution is created 
within poor countries by natural resource extraction and factories that pro-
duce goods that are sold to the affluent. The difficulty with reducing it is 
that economic growth almost inevitably leads to greater pollution, and the 
economic growth of poor countries is necessary for a long-term solution to 
global poverty.
4
 What is needed is more growth by poor countries and less 
by affluent ones. But how to bring that about is very unclear. Furthermore, 
much of the problem is how that growth is distributed within poor coun-
tries. It is difficult to see how effective growth could be engineered econom-
ically and politically. So we cannot hold individuals responsible for finding 
the solution in order to call on their governments to bring it about. Again 
there is a severe epistemic problem for individuals to find out what should 
be done to avoid violating the human rights of the poor. 
Finally, Pogge is clearly right that trade protectionism by affluent coun-
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tries is wrong and should be ended. Poor countries should be given more 
latitude to protect their industries. But the combination of trade protection-
ism and liberalism that will best serve the poor is less clear. 
In general, I agree with Pogge’s points about how relatively affluent 
countries are violating the human rights of the poor. I think that there are 
some questions about how exactly we should change the global order to 
stop violating these rights. (In this way, the case of ending global poverty is 
quite different from ending slavery, an analogy that Pogge presses.) Know-
ing which action to perform at the individual level depends on knowing 
what collective action will result in avoiding violating the human rights of 
the poor. But as we have seen, it is often unclear what exactly to do, and 
some individual and collective actions might actually create more harm 
than good.  
There is also a feasibility problem. Pogge’s argument depends on the 
claim that there is a feasible alternative system that would secure the hu-
man rights of the poor. If there were no alternative, then there would be no 
duty to do otherwise.
5
 Pogge responds that even if there is not a feasible al-
ternative system that would solve the problem of poverty, we can at least 
say that if we stop doing the six things he lists, then we would not be violat-
ing the human rights of the poor even if poverty remains. Just as slavery 
should be ended even if the freed slaves end up being equally poor and 
miserable, so our collective violations of the human rights of the poor in 
these six ways should end even if doing so does not end poverty.  A closer 
analogy would be if slavery were inevitable even if I quit being a slave-
holder.  It is still clear that I have a duty not to enslave, but it is only a ques-
tion of who has the dirty hands. 
The most difficult part of Pogge’s argument to follow concerns the 
claim that individuals are obligated to do particular things either to desist 
from these collective violations of human rights or to end global poverty. 
There is a gap between what Pogge thinks we must do to discharge our 
negative duty as an individual and what it takes to secure the human rights 
of the poor. The gap can be seen when one considers that acting as an indi-
vidual, no matter how ethically or charitably, cannot guarantee that the 
human rights of the poor will be secure.  This is what we might call the col-
lectivity problem, which is that the only way to change the global order is 
to act collectively, and that is not guaranteed by individuals’ actions.  
In each of the six ways Pogge lists that we are violating the human 
rights of the poor, we are doing so collectively, through our governments 
and the supranational organizations that we have collectively erected. No 
single individual (unless we are those particular individuals who have spe-
cial roles in those institutions) can prevent a governments from allowing 
dictators to sell their countries’ natural resources, set banking regulations 
so that dictators cannot harbor ill-gotten gains or so that companies cannot 
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evade taxes, or set the conditions on international loans. Nor can that indi-
vidual (unless she happen to be the owner or chief executive officer or 
board member of a large company) affect the level of global pollution. Most 
individuals can have no effect whatsoever on any of these things. If I were 
the last individual needed to join a political effort to change laws, I could 
have an effect. But it is rare for any one of us to be that person, and even 
more rare for us to know that we are. But this is what it would take to argue 
that I have a duty to act as an individual to desist from one of these six 
ways that we collectively violate the human rights of the poor. 
Likewise, no individual can directly end global poverty. Perhaps there 
are a few individuals who could stall poverty for a short time by spending 
all of their wealth on feeding, buying medicines, and building shelter and 
medical facilities, but this would be a temporary fix. Thus, again we need to 
engage in collective action to solve the problem. Pogge argues that this 
need for collective action does not mean that we have only collective duties, 
which can only be discharged collectively. If we had only a collective duty, 
then we would need others to perform in order for each of us to have the 
duty to also perform. He claims that each one of us has a duty to do our 
own part even if others do not do theirs.  
Even if an individual is obligated to act to end poverty despite the ina-
bility of the individual to guarantee that by so acting poverty will be signif-
icantly diminished, it is not clear what the individual is obligated to do. 
Pogge thinks individuals can discharge their duties in two ways.  We can 
join an effective political action to change global institutions, and we can 
contribute a portion of our wealth to the effort. He mentions but dismisses 
massive development aid, since that is not cost effective or sustainable. It is 
better to collectively act to change the institutional order so that it does not 
pose an obstacle to the ability of the poor to develop their economies 
enough to rise out of poverty. Pogge also dismisses the option of emigrat-
ing to a poor country to divest oneself of the duty to help the poor. The bet-
ter option is to pay compensation to support “effective international agents 
or non-governmental organizations,” in order to reduce the human rights 
deficits. He offers a way to calculate the compensation that a relatively af-
fluent person owes, but this solution again falls prey to the collectivity 
problem. Such a contribution cannot make any noticeable difference to re-
ducing global poverty unless others do their part. If the others do not do 
their part, then one’s contribution is no more a reparation or a desisting 
from violating the rights of the poor than doing nothing. Now, one might 
respond that contributing to Oxfam or some other effective global charity 
reduces some of the misery for some of the global poor, and if this is the 
best one can do, it is better than nothing. But this kind of charitable giving, 
like development aid (only worse, since it is less) is not going to change the 
global order. If this is the negative duty we turn out to have, the argument 
ends with a less effective contribution than we might have hoped for. 
In conclusion, Pogge offers an aggressive, challenging position concern-
ing our duty to the world’s poor. In order not to violate their rights, we – 
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each of us relatively affluent persons – must  act. We not only have a collec-
tive duty that can only be discharged in a collective, we also have an indi-
vidual duty to inspire collective action or at minimum to give a sum of our 
money to an effective charity to combat poverty. I have raised three poten-
tial problems for his view. First, there are epistemic problems with knowing 
exactly what is to be done in order to do the best we can to eradicate pov-
erty. Second there is a question about whether a feasible alternative global 
order exists, though this does not take away from the point that feasible al-
ternative or no, we must avoid actively harming the rights of the poor. 
Third, and most significantly, there are collectivity problems with claiming 
that one has a negative duty to do something that may be completely inef-
fective in stopping the rights violations that gave rise to the negative duty. 
In the end, it seems, we are left with an individual duty that will not set us 
on a path to ending global poverty. 
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